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ABSTRACT

Fear-based Policymaking: How Government Agencies
Exploit Mortality Risk Perceptions

by

Alecia M. Hunter, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2016

Major Professor: Randy Simmons
Department: Economics and Finance

The Value of a Statistical Life represents how much a population values reducing
the probability of death. American citizens and government agencies use the Value of a
Statistical Life estimates in benefit-cost analysis to pass life-saving policies. The public
uses this measurement as a scientific and objective tool to identify potentially favorable
policy from ineffective and inefficient policy. Institutional incentives, however, are
aligned for agencies to exaggerate Value of a Statistical Life calculations and
overregulate markets. This thesis summarizes how the Value of a Statistical Life data
sources, methods of estimation, and inconsistent behavioral reference points distort the
statistical calculations. Despite the distorted estimation, agencies still rely heavily on the
Value of a Statistical Life as a tool to pass policy. Public choice theory explains that
agencies employ distorted information as a tactic to pass regulation. The theory
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demonstrates that regulators are self-interested not unlike the general public. This thesis
provides a public choice analysis and concludes that agencies are incentivized to employ
distorted data sources, methods of calculation, and public risk perceptions to inflate the
Value of a Statistical Life and overregulate. As such, the Value of a Statistical Life will
continue to be biased and inaccurate with the current methods of calculation and
addressing political incentives.
(51 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Fear-based Policymaking: How Government Agencies
Exploit Mortality Risk Perceptions
Alecia M. Hunter
The objective of this thesis is to explore how government policymakers use
distorted Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) calculations for their personal benefit. The
VSL estimates how much a large group of citizens would jointly pay to save the life a
one random person from a fatal disease. The VSL is used by government agencies like
the Environmental Protection Agency. Agencies use the VSL in benefit-cost analyses to
help determine potentially favorable life-saving policy from wasteful policy. Despite the
well-intentioned objectiveness and decisiveness of the VSL, the political framework
incentivizes miscalculated and exaggerated VSL estimates. Public choice theory
addresses plausible reason as to why the decades of suggested VSL inaccuracies have not
been resolved by those with political power. Public choice theory explains that
policymakers are self-interested people. The general public expects political leaders,
however, to become self-sacrificing public servants once elected. This thesis is an
example and an explanation why those in political office employ distorted VSL
calculations. Specifically, those in government agencies aim to maximize budgets and
regulatory control for job security. The VSL data sources, methods of estimation, and
inconsistent behavioral reference points exaggerate VSL calculations. These
miscalculated or purposefully inflated VSL estimates lead to large policy implications
that add to government inefficiencies and impose costs on taxpayers and businesses.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulatory agencies are in the business of making rules. After Congress passes a
law, agencies create specific rules and regulations to implement each law. Each agency is
expected to justify their proposed rules by comparing expected benefits to expected costs.
Formal benefit-cost analyses allow agencies to portray the value of their proposed rules.
As long as the agencies can plausibly show that the benefits outweigh the costs, then the
proposed policies are promulgated. Agencies use what is called the Value of a Statistical
Life (VSL) to monetize the benefits of proposed regulations. The VSL is a tradeoff
between wealth and small risk reductions (e.g., 1 in 10,000) in a defined period. For
example, the VSL is how much a group of similar individuals are jointly willing to pay to
avoid one random, premature death within the group. Despite being a key component for
agencies to justify regulations under acts of Congress, VSL calculations are often inflated
or biased, which skews agencies' abilities to accurately assess the impact of regulations.
Evidence suggests that government agencies purposefully calculate VSLs to
ensure regulations that seem beneficial rather than costly. Both regulators and the public
use the VSL as a tool for their own benefit. The general public wants agencies to
calculate the costs and benefits of proposed regulations. The average person, however,
has a difficult time accurately perceiving the true probabilities of risks (Slovic, 1987).
People systematically overestimate small risks, meaning that the VSL is often skewed.
Regulators allow these misperceptions to inflate the VSL and overstate the benefits of
proposed regulation. Regulators are incentivized to inflate the VSL estimate as high as
possible to make their proposed regulation seem especially beneficial. Regulators inflate
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the VSL by employing ambiguous estimation methods, biased data sources, and
exaggerated risk misperceptions. As long as VSLs are calculated in this way, the benefit
estimates of proposed regulations will continue to be biased and inaccurate. This thesis
examines the VSL calculations, the behavioral economics of risk misperceptions in the
general public, and the public choice incentives of regulators who capitalize on these
misperceptions for their own benefit.
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UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION
This thesis is a public choice analysis on government agencies use of the Value of
a Statistical Life (VSL) in benefit-cost analyses. Public choice analyses observe and
explain political behavior through institutional incentives. The general VSL literature has
overwhelming research that suggest VSL calculations are highly uncertain or strictly
inflated. More recent research explores how risk perception and behavioral biases also
distort VSL estimates.
Only one paper, though, combines both behavioral economics and public choice
theory. In March 2015, W. Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer published "Behavioral Public
Choice: The Behavioral Paradox of Government Policy." Viscusi and Gayer's
contribution specifically targets Sunstein's call for behavioral public choice theory in the
context of the VSL. Their paper describes first, that politicians are vulnerable to
psychological biases rather than highly functioning benevolent dictators, and second, that
policymakers have public choice incentives.
This thesis is also a public choice analysis. This paper, however, encompasses a
broader analysis of public choice incentives to distort VSL calculations. First, the paper
explains the VSL and how it is used by agencies and Congress. Next, the paper analyzes
three areas of VSL distortions: the data utilized by agencies, the methods of estimating
the VSL, and behavioral biases used as inconsistent reference points for policymaking.
The three VSL distortions are tied together with a public choice analysis, which is the
thesis's main contribution to VSL and public choice literature. The public choice analysis
explains areas of the VSL where regulators employ uncertainty and inflation, as well as
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explore the conflicting use of VSL estimates by policymakers and the general public. All
groups of people are rationally self-interested and use the VSL differently to attempt to
maximize their well-being. Lastly, this paper recommends "nudges" and free-market
solutions that respect consumer sovereignty rather than override consumer choice.

5
THE VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE
The VSL is an estimation of how much a hypothetical group of people would
jointly pay to prevent the death of one random person in the group within the next year.
For example, if the VSL is calculated at $3 million and a proposed government regulation
is predicted to save 20 lives, the monetized benefits of the regulation would be $60
million. When agencies can monetize the benefits of a proposed regulation, they can
contrast the expected benefits with the expected costs. Benefit-cost analyses (BCA) have
become one of the most decisive methods for implementing rules and regulations.
The title "Value of a Statistical Life" is often confused with the value of a human
life, which are two very different measurements. The value of a human life evaluates the
worth of an identified person. A statistical life does not identify the worth of an
individual but the willingness of society to pay to decrease the risk of death. A simple
way to visualize the VSL is to imagine a group of 100,000 people. Suppose that one
person in that group is likely to die from lead poisoning without government intervention.
The group of 100,000 is willing to spend a certain amount to save that one random person
who is statistically predicted to die without the government policy. The VSL is this
willingness to pay for the "life" conserved.1
VSL estimates differ across agencies. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) suggests that agencies use VSL estimates ranging from $1 million to $10 million
per statistical life (no specified dollar year). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
currently uses a VSL ranging from $7 million to $9 million, the Environmental Protection
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This is an annual measurement.
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Agency's (EPA) VSL is at $8.7 million, and the Department of Transportation's VSL is
estimated at $9.4 million.,
Each agency has a different VSL calculation because of the varying pool of
available and appropriate studies for each of the agencies' fatality scenarios. For example,
a large body of data exists for occupational injury-related accidental deaths rather than
death from disease. The Department of Transportation uses of injury-related data to
calculate their VSL is relatively more similar to the scenarios that the DOT addresses
than, for say, the energy or health agencies. The EPA, on the other hand, also mostly uses
occupational data and some consumer product data, such as studies on cigarette
purchases and smoke detector usage. Much of this data is between 25 and 40 years old,
making EPA estimates less relevant to the scenarios they are trying to model.
VSLs also vary between agencies because each agency adjusts their base VSL
studies differently. Agencies adjust VSL estimates when data does not reflect the specific
regulatory scenarios being assessed. Data may differ from the actual affected population
by data characteristics such as age, income, and health status. The OMB asserts, however,
that there is only sufficient evidence to adjust for real income and for delays in death after
exposure to a harmful scenario. VSLs are adjusted to reflect a population's income.
Greater income is associated with a larger WTP for fatal risk reductions. Latency of a
fatal scenario can be reflected in the VSL by discounting the benefits of a policy over the
years from when the policy is enacted until the population has gained the full policy
benefits. For example, if a policy reduces an environmental pollution in one year, but the
entire benefits of the policy take effect five years later, the VSL would be adjusted to
account for the 5-year lag of full benefits.
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This thesis focuses heavily on the EPA’s VSL because the EPA is one of the
widest reaching and fastest growing agencies. The EPA claims that their rules have
provided trillions of dollars of benefits, but these benefits are rooted in their flawed VSL
calculations. For instance, the EPA claims that the Clean Air Act provided more than $22
trillion in benefits from 1970 until 1990, but this massive number relied on the risk
reduction estimated by the EPA's own VSL (EPA, 1999). Of the total benefits calculated
using VSLs, the EPA's rules accounted for as much as 80% of the total benefits of all
rules proposed in 2012 (GPO, 2012). Analyzing the EPA's use of VSLs is particularly
beneficial because the EPA's rules affect nearly every aspect of daily American life and
industry.
The EPA faces the major problem that their reliance on occupational data is not
reflective of environmental risk-reducing scenarios. The EPA's occupational studies only
include those in the labor force and middle-aged employees. Therefore, there is a large
gap between the studies and actuality because EPA policies affect a much broader range
of the population than middle-aged people in the workforce. Because few studies are
available, it is not always possible to update the research literature to reflect the
differences for each policy scenario. In attempt to close the gap between data and reality,
agencies adjust the base estimates for income growth and any time lags that in policy
benefits.
Methods of Calculating the VSL
A basic method of estimating the VSL starts with researchers observing
compensation and risk trends in revealed and stated preference studies. For instance,

8
using occupational data, a researcher observes the risk of death of a coal miner and how
much that coal miner is compensated. The coal miner's risk-compensation data is used to
estimate how much wealth people are willing to forgo to obtain less risky employment.
Next, researchers translate the change of risk into terms of compensation.
Occupational fatalities and injury risk data comes from actuarial tables, workers'
compensation data, and death certificate statistics. These risk probabilities vary for each
source, which may alter VSL estimates.2 Using the previous example, the coal miner's
chance of dying is 1 in 13,000 and she is compensated $60,000 per year, versus a
construction worker's chance of dying which is 1 in 15,000 and then compensated
$58,500 per year. A researcher then generalizes that people are willing to give up $1,500
for the reduced chance of death of 1 in 2,000, all other variables held constant.
The final step of calculating an agency's VSL is generalizing the risk to wealth
exchange for all risk-reducing policies. Field experts estimate how much a proposed
policy will reduce the risk of death for the specified hazard. Referring back to the
examples of the coal miner and the construction worker, if a policy were to decrease the
risk of death by 1 in 2,000 for 2,000 homogenous people with the same willingness to
pay of $1,500, then 2,000 people would jointly pay $3 million to randomly save one
group member's life. The $3 million is the group's VSL estimate for that policy.
More complex estimation methods, however, are used to estimate the VSL. For
example, a Bayesian approach is often used by VSL researchers to model the probability
of uncertain events (Kochi et al., 2006). A meta-regression is used to examine how
individual VSL estimates vary with study and respondent characteristics. Study and
2

Viscusi and Aldy (2003) explore the differences in risk estimation with the listed sources of risk data
further.
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respondent characteristics include occupational or traffic studies as well as age and
education features.
VSL estimates are based off of utility functions. Utility theory assumes that the
consumer will only give up income in exchange for a risk reduction as long as her utility
stays the same. Utility functions are also subject to a personal budget constraint. An
individual has limited resources and is unlikely to expend all her income on ensuring her
safety.
Figure 1 shows an indifference curve within a utility function. This indifference
curve represents different bundles of risk and wealth along the entire curve. The left-hand
side of the curve has lower probabilities of survival with higher pay, and the right-hand
side of the curve has higher probabilities of survival with lower pay. Utility, or the
consumer satisfaction between levels of risk and income packages, is the same along the
entirety of the indifference curve. The expected utility function assumes that an
individual prefers to consume in areas above the indifference curves, and she disfavors
any area of consumption below her indifference curve (Binger & Hoffman, 1998).
A person's preferred level of risk to wealth tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 1. The
point X depicts a person's starting income and mortality risk. The vertical axis represents
income or wealth, and the horizontal axis represents the probability of survival. The slope
of the indifference curve describes a person's rate of exchange between wealth and risk
with the intention of the consumer maximizing her utility. The most she would trade to
change her probability of surviving (Δp) is a proportional change in wealth (Δw). From
the coal miner and construction worker example, the researcher estimated that people
gave up $1,500 (Δw) to reduce their risk of death by 1 in 2,000 (Δp) while maintaining
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their utility. This hypothetical model of a population estimates the VSL for the group as
$3 million.3

Figure 1. Preference for income and survival probability

Nonmarket Value Estimations
The VSL calculations requires two pieces of information: the total risk reductions
from a proposed policy and how much the population is willing to pay for the risk
reductions. Field specialists estimate the number of public lives "saved" from a proposed
policy. Economists use revealed and stated preference studies as nonmarket values to
derive willingness to pay for risk reductions.
3

$30*100,000 = $3 million
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Economists use proxy market values to estimate the VSL because public goods,
like environmental quality, are not exchanged between people or groups. People cannot
trade goods without private property rights. Property rights must be defined, secure, and
transferable (Coase, 1960). Environmental quality and other public goods, thus, cannot be
traded without ownership. Because public goods are not traded in the market, prices
cannot be directly determined. The equilibrium between what people are willing to pay
and the cost of the product cannot be observed directly by economists. Instead,
economists use nonmarket scenarios. Researchers use revealed preference and stated
preference studies as proxy scenarios to estimate willingness to pay for fatal risk
reductions. These estimates, in turn, are used in the VSL derivation.
Revealed preference studies analyze individuals' actual purchasing decisions of a
specific good. Revealed preference studies are often used in nonmarket valuation studies.
For example, economists observe people's preferences for reduced air and noise pollution
through property markets. They use econometric techniques to find the correlation
between property prices and pollution levels.
Wage-risk studies are the most common revealed preference approaches in VSL
analysis. Wage-risk studies observe the difference in pay for riskier jobs, holding other
worker characteristics constant. This means that economists expect that employees
demand higher pay for greater risk of death. It is assumed that worker preferences are
reflected through the level of occupational risk and level of compensation.
Revealed preference studies used to estimate VSLs, however, are somewhat
controversial. The markets for the scenario of interest often do not exist. For instance, the
EPA's air pollution policies are not represented well with wage-risk data. The benefits of
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air pollution affect younger and older demographics that are not included in the labor
market, which are not included in wage-risk data. Revealed preference data often requires
researchers to adjustment the data to reflect the scenarios modeled by agencies. These
data adjustments are explored further later in this paper.
Stated preference studies are the other nonmarket valuation method. Stated
preference studies have previously been conducted with mail-in surveys or interviews. In
more recent years, researchers have adapted to online willingness to pay surveys. Online
surveys can arguably collect a more representative population sample at a lower cost than
alternative options. Additionally, online surveys have contributed to the
comprehensibility of the survey questions. Online surveys typically include interactive
visuals to aid respondents in understanding the meaning of the surveys and the value of
their answers.
Stated preference studies are often useful in VSL literature because the questions
can seek specific information. Researchers can ask questions regarding a respondent's
decisions given a theoretical situation. VSL survey questions often target situations that
cannot be assessed using revealed preference data.
Stated preferences studies, however, are used less often than revealed preference
data. It is often found that survey answers do not match how respondents act in the
marketplace. Intuitively, respondents may have thoughtless answers because surveytakers face no real consequences.
Revealed and stated preference studies are then used together in a meta-analysis.
Agencies use meta-analysis to calculate the official agency VSL. A meta-analysis is a
collection of independent preference studies to form one large analysis. This method of
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analysis increases the statistical validity of the study by including more and diverse
observations. Meta-analyses help address variation in demographic characteristics as well
as methods used to estimate the VSL.
Meta-analyses, however, are still prone to statistical biases and problems. This is
because the collection of studies depends on the judgment of the researcher and his or her
"best estimate." The researcher decides which studies to include in the meta-analysis and
which populations to represent. The subjectivity of the researcher may bias the results.
Additionally, not all studies will include the same variables across studies. This is a
common problem in VSL occupational data. Many labor studies often do not include
variables for both industry and occupation. Excluding these variables increases the
difficulty of the meta-analysis and decrease the accuracy of the results.
Finally, economists calculate the benefits of a proposed policy by using metaanalysis methods. The benefits are used in agencies' benefit cost analyses (BCA). The
benefits are calculated by multiplying the predicted number of statistical lives saved from
a proposed policy by the willingness to pay for the proposed policy. If the benefits are
greater than the costs of the policy, then the policy is passed as a regulation to implement
the laws created by Congress. The BCA is a soft determinant of passing regulation.
Sometimes agencies will ignore cost and pass policy anyways.
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DISTORTIONS IN VSL ESTIMATES
There are three contexts of the VSL estimate that suggest that the VSL is
distorted. The first distortion comes from the data and studies used to estimate the VSL.
It is arguable that they are not representative of the scenarios that agencies attempt to
address with policy. Data and study problems included publication biasedness, uncertain
estimates with stated preference studies, and limitations with revealed preference studies.
Second, analysts use oversimplified VSL estimation methods by prematurely averaging
and aggregating collected data. Doing this suppresses the values of a demographic
characteristics, which are imperative to increase the accuracy of econometric results. The
last distortion occurs because of behavioral biases. Behavioral economics shows that
individuals systematically overestimate small risks and underestimate relatively larger
risks (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Peoples' risk misperceptions are fundamental
evidence that the VSL is exaggerated. Rather than align incentives for consumers to
overcome psychological biases, agencies use these biases as justifications to create
policy. Despite the VSL's intention to be used as an objective tool, government agencies
use distorted and inflated VSL calculations to overregulate markets.
Uncertain VSL Estimates from Preference
Studies and Econometric Methods

Publication Biasedness
Previous VSL researchers have assumed that the menu of VSL estimates were
model samples of the current population and therefore valid to use in meta-analysis.
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Analysts, however, have not accounted for publication bias (Doucouliagos, 2012).
Publication bias happens when researchers less frequently report insignificant or negative
VSL estimates or such results are less likely to be published. Doucouliagos et al. (2012)
explain that authors of nonmarket valuation studies may be hesitant to publish VSL
estimates that are small, statistically insignificant, or negative. In a previous study,
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2008) conclude that the VSL literature is no special case of
selectivity biasedness. They report that two-thirds of experimental economics are prone
to publication bias. Additionally, Doucouliagos et al. (2012) found “if the available VSL
estimates are truncated and/or a selected sample, then any average, weighted or simple,
will lead to a biased estimate of VSL.” Truncation and selectivity result in inflated VSL
averages leading to faulty benefit-cost analysis interpretations.
Doucouliagos et al. (2012) estimated their own VSL using conservative
adjustments for publication bias. Their VSL was estimated at $3.77 million (2015), below
most major estimates. In 2015 dollars, Miller (2000) reported a VSL of $5.27 million4
and $9.63 million5 from Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Not all VSL estimates, however, are
lower than that assessed by Doucouliagos. Mrozek and Taylor (2002) found a lower
estimate of around $3 million.6 Overall, Doucouliagos et al. find significant evidence
suggesting that the VSL literature does not adjust VSL estimates for publication
biasedness. Failing to do so exaggerates the reported VSL estimates.

4

Inflated using the CPI inflation calculator from $3.9 million 2000 dollars.
Inflated using the CPI inflation calculator from $7 million 2003 dollars.
6
Inflated using the CPI inflation calculator from $2.34 million 2000 dollars.
5
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Inaccurate Stated Preference Studies
Stated preference studies also provide uncertain and inconsistent information.
This is because survey-takers have little incentive to have thoughtful survey responses.
Respondents face no real consequences for the information they provide (Blumenschein
et al., 2009).
Researchers use scope tests to increase the reliability of stated preference studies.
Scope tests measure the respondents' sensitivity to the degree of risk reduction. Scope
tests, however, are often not used by agencies. When used, the preference studies do not
pass a scope test (Ludwig & Neumann, 2012). To pass a strong scope test, respondents
must report a proportionate willingness to pay for risk reductions changes. A weak scopes
test requires willingness to pay to increase with risk reduction regardless of the
magnitude.
For example, in 2010 the EPA attempted to update the studies used to estimate the
VSL with three meta-analyses (EPA, 2011b). Of the new studies collected, only about
half of the studies underwent a scope test. Of these studies, 90% of the VSL estimates
passed the weak scope test but only 15% passed the strong scope test (Ludwig &
Neumann, 2012). The studies collected by the EPA were never incorporated into official
guidance, nor subject to a Science Advisory Board (SAB) peer-review process.
Given that agencies like the EPA inconsistently use scope tests and few studies
pass strong scope tests, it can be concluded that stated preference studies are another
form of VSL distortion.
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Limitations of Revealed Preference Studies
Revealed preference studies, unlike stated preference studies, directly observe
consumer behavior. VSL researchers are particularly interested in observing levels of risk
of death and income, controlling for other variables such as education. The VSL literature
identifies three main problems with the EPA's revealed preferences studies. These
problems can be extended to other agencies' VSL estimation methods because of all
agencies' reliance on occupational studies. Problems with revealed preference studies
stem back to reliance on older risk data and endogeneity of job risk.
VSL estimates are largely made up of occupational because of the prevalence of
census data. Consumer products are also used for revealed preference studies, which
include observations with cigarette purchases, automobile safety, and smoke detectors
(Fisher et al., 1989). The current data that the EPA uses for their VSL estimates were
published between 1974 and 1991 (EPA, 2010). Older data has more questionable
sources and methods of measurement than the current methods of data collection. In
addition, the preferences of individuals represented in the data collected 25 plus years ago
may not be reflective of the population's preferences today.
Econometric Challenges
Econometric calculations are not a new challenge for VSL economists. The
statistical methods to estimating the VSL have alarming problems and are worth
questioning the validity of the VSL. For instance, the EPA employed Black et al. (2003)
and Black and Kniesner (2003) to recreate wage-risk estimations using 10 arrangements
of commonly used laborer and risk datasets. Black et al. found that the value on lethal
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risk varied broadly. Additionally, the fatal risk variable was only statistically significant
in less than half of the studies (Cropper et al., 2011). The authors deduced, "Collectively,
these findings lead us to have severe doubts about the usefulness of existing estimates to
guide public policy” (p. 3).
Econometric methods are often complicated because of collinearity between
important variables like fatal and nonfatal risk as well as industry and occupational
variables. Collinearity makes it difficult to disentangle the relative impacts of each
variable on the dependent variable. For example, fatal and nonfatal risk both explain
higher incomes. Including both variables in an econometric model, however, results in
less precise estimates. Studies show that omitting nonfatal injury risk can bias VSL
estimates by 20% to 150% using actuary risk data on U.S workers (Viscusi, 1977).
Additionally, Liu and Hammitt (1999) used stated preference studies form Taiwanese
workers and found that VSL estimates were biased by 100%.
Panel data and instrumental variables can be used to combat collinearity. Kniesner
et al. (2012) and Hintermann et al. (2010) used cross-sectional time-series data to
estimate workers’ compensation and risk for the United States and the United Kingdom.
Kniesner found that VSL estimates were reduced by about 50% when they controlled for
worker characteristics compared to cross-sectional studies. Hintermann, on the other
hand, did not find statistically significant VSL measures when using cross-sectional timeseries data.
Omitted variables may explain endogeneity of job risk (Garren, 1988; Cropper et
al., 2011). Sometimes variables are difficult to measurable such as how much individuals
can control his or her level of risk. For example, one person may have more awareness of
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the risks associated with a job when compared to someone else with the same job. That
awareness of the risk is difficult to measure but important in explaining the difference
between occupational death rates (Shogren & Stamland, 2002). Shogren and Stamland
found inflated VSL estimates without variables to account for worker's' unobservable
skills.
Oversimplified VSL Estimation Methods
Many economists question if a fixed VSL is a serious oversimplification (Aldy &
Viscusi, 2008, Braathen et al., 2009; Cameron, 2010, Cameron & DeShazo, 2013;
Hammitt, 2000). There is a plethora of VSL literature studying specific adjustments that
show the problem of oversimplifying the VSL. Two of the most commonly discussed
adjustments include age and wealth. In 2011, the Science Advisory Board (SAB) stated
that the risk reduction estimates are not "one size fits all" values (EPA, 2011b). In 2003
the EPA found evidence showing that elderly people tend to not be willing to pay (WTP)
as much to decrease their risk of death (Aldy & Viscusi, 2007, 2008). With this
information, the EPA attempted to decrease the VSL for those 65 years and older. After a
political upheaval, however, all attempts to change the EPA's estimate were dropped
(Cameron, 2010). These political behaviors raise questions about agency agendas.
The two main arguments in support of a one-size-fits-all VSL are political
simplicity and fairness (Cameron, 2010). Many people view that placing different values
on the lives of individuals with varying characteristic is discriminatory. Some people
insist that—wealthy or poor, old or young, risk-takers or those involuntarily exposed to
risk—everyone ought to have the same risk reduction value for fatal risk changes.

20
Generalizing risk reduction values to all people, however, decreases the accuracy of VSL
estimates.
Before jumping into the mathematical methods that generalize VSL estimates, it
is conducive to review how VSLs are calculated. The mathematical VSL equation
requires risk reductions and how much people are willing to pay for those risk reductions
that are provided by a regulation. First, field specialists estimate risk reductions of an
affected population that come from a proposed government program. Next, the fractional
risk reductions are aggregated to form statistical “lives.”7 Lastly, willingness to pay
methods for risk reductions are used to monetize the valued risk-reductions for a benefitcost analysis.
All characteristic information for the data observations, however, is lost because
risk is aggregated in the first step. Thus, the dollar measure cannot reflect individual
preferences or budget limitations. The calculation is simply the change in risk multiplied
by the average population's marginal willingness to pay per statistical life. This has
previously been acceptable to keep calculations simple and to maintain the "fairness"
argument for a one-size-fits-all VSL. Intuitively, it is clear that people's marginal WTP
for risk reduction and the risk reductions themselves will vary widely from a proposed
policy. Therefore, the current VSL calculation is only appropriate if the population faces
the same risk reductions and has the same willingness to pay for the risk reduction.
A more accurate way to estimate the VSL is to postpone aggregation. For
instance, if the EPA proposed tighter environmental standards, it will impact people
differently based on whether some people are already satisfying the higher standard than

7

One statistical life has been reached once enough fractional risk reductions have been aggregated.
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others. Higher incomes may be correlated to those neighborhoods that are in compliance
compared to those that are not. Those not in compliance with the policy will have greater
benefits, whereas the community already in compliance will not gain anything from the
proposed policy. Individual marginal WTP for forecasted risk reduction is negatively
correlated with higher income as people are not willing to pay for risk reductions when
there are no benefits. If the negatively correlated WTP differences are ignored by
analysts, the social benefits of the policy are exaggerated.
Rather than allow VSL estimates to vary by significant demographic preferences,
agencies generalize one VSL for the entire population. The current method of estimating
the VSL is an appropriate method of measurement only if everyone faces the same risk
and have the same willingness to pay for the proposed program. Because individuals are
unique, the VSL is not representative of the citizens and is therefore not an appropriate
measurement. A more appropriate method of calculating VSL is to postpone aggregation.
Postponing aggregation would allow analysts to more accurately estimate the benefits of
a proposed policy.
Exaggerating Mortality Risks
This section explores a few direct psychological biases as well as their effects on
VSL estimates. Sources of psychological biases include two aspects of the prospect
theory and the availability heuristic. The first source of biasedness is explained by how
individuals overestimate uncertainty in low-probability events, which is often modeled by
VSL estimates. For example, Lichtenstein and associates (1978) compared the actual
death rates of diseases to the study respondents' perceived rates of death. The study
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included rare illnesses including botulism, smallpox, and poisoning by vitamins. They
found that low frequency events were ten times overestimated than actual risks. In
contrast, high frequency events were underestimated like stomach cancer and heart
disease. Viscusi and Gayer (2015) stated, “one of the best-documented biases people
exhibit in thinking about risky choices is related to their perceptions of the absolute level
of a risk.” Strictly speaking, people tend to deflate relatively large risks such as stroke
and heart disease, while inflating small risks. Viscusi and Gayer continued, “[t]his
property creates a substantial potential for overreactions to small risks such as those
posed by weak carcinogens and nanoparticles."
The next source of biasedness to VSL estimates—ambiguity aversion—
demonstrates that people have stronger preferences for a certain outcome rather than
chance outcome (Ellsberg, 1961). This was explained in the earlier example: if option A
is a 90% chance of winning $800 but a 10% chance of winning nothing, and option B
guarantees $500, people tend to prefer option B. People systematically avoid ambiguous
situations. Similarly, health scenarios addressed by agencies like the EPA face the
difficult task of estimating health and life risks faced by the population. Additionally,
citizens demand zero risk for food safety and environmental risk to avoid health
uncertainties (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989). Viscusi et al. (1991) tested ambiguity
aversion on environmental pollution resulting in the possibility of nerve disease. When
survey respondents were given the choice to live in two polluted areas with equal mean
probabilities of risk, respondents preferred the location with less ambiguous risk. The
study supports that people tend to avoid ambiguity.
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Government institutions also often suffer from ambiguity aversion. Policies lean
toward the conservative side to avoid ambiguous risk. When outcomes are uncertain,
agencies tend to pass more stringent regulations. For example, Viscusi and Zeckhauser
(2014) found that the (FDA) allow risk uncertainty to influence which pharmaceuticals
meet public standards. The FDA places greater value on the possibility of error than of
that of improving the quality of lives or saving lives. The FDA is incentivized to avoid
the responsibility of a faulty drug, resulting that fewer pharmaceuticals enter into the
market.
Lastly, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) explained the availability heuristics as a
mental shortcut used to deal with complex situations where a person must judge the
probability of an event occurring. For example, if someone were asked what their
probability of being poisoned by their water source is, the average response may be
greater than the actual risk. This is because those in the study mentally work through their
experiences and may remember reading about water contamination in the news. Others
may think about how they, or their friends or family, have never had a problem with their
water safety. The extreme and frightening events tend to receive more media coverage
than normal events, which may add to the available memories in an individual’s mind.
This cognitive process explains why people tend to systematically overestimate risk and
VSL estimates.
The VSL requires people, who are psychological agents, to place a value on risks
that they perceive. To help mitigate behavioral anomalies, it is suggested that studies pass
scope tests. Scope tests are used as a tool to increase the reliability of stated preference
studies because it measures respondents' sensitivity to the magnitude of risk reduction.
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Though scope tests are one method to increase the reliability of studies, the tests are often
not used or the studies do not pass the test (Ludwig & Neumann, 2012). The biases and
failed scope tests both suggest that the general public does not consistently act rationally.
Therefore, the VSL lacks a normative reference point.
The following examples demonstrate that different agencies use inconsistent
policy reference points based on public risk perceptions. Additionally, the risk
perceptions of these two scenarios are largely susceptible to behavioral biases and public
choice incentives, which helps explain two case studies later in this paper.
First, environmentally risky scenarios are sometimes viewed as uncontrollable
and frightening such as the result of cancer. Slovic (1987) found that the WTP for
stomach cancer was nearly double that for other sources. Referring to prospect theory and
the availability heuristic, individuals often exaggerate the probability of death from
environmental-related scenarios. This is because environmental risks tend to be uncertain
due to the low-frequency of fatal events occurring. Additionally, when these tragic events
do happen, they tend to have large media coverage which increases the perceived
relevance to an individual's life.
Second, people tend to underestimate fatal traffic risks. The preference to drive
rather than fly is an example of underestimated risk perception. Even though the risk is
well-known, some people still spend additional resources on the riskier option of driving
rather than flying. The false assumption is that a person is in control of her vehicle and
can control the riskiness of her driving (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989).
These sources of uncertainty, inconsistency, and risk misperception support that
the VSL relies on arbitrary methods of calculation and is fundamentally the public's
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exaggerated risk perceptions. This leads to the VSL being grossly exaggerated which in
turn allows agencies to create misrepresented policy.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
Public choice theory explains why government agencies use arbitrary and inflated
VSL estimates. According to public choice theory, people are rationally self-interested,
whether they are in the public or the private sector. Key to public choice theory is
methodological individualism. This is the idea that people have preferences and make
decisions and groups do not (Buchanan, 1984). For example, and to reiterate, Congress
and agencies do not make decisions. The members of these groups makes decisions based
off their interests. This aligns with basic economic theory that the units of observation are
choosing, acting, and behaving people rather than units of groups, states, or branches of
government that make decisions. The VSL was originally created with the intention to
account for society's preferences to determine the value of mortality risk reductions.
Congress and government agencies, nonetheless, use the VSL to ensure job security by
creating policies that play to the public’s fears and misunderstandings found in the VSL.
Public and Private Use of the VSL
The private individuals that make up society employ the VSL to help determine
what level of risk the public is willing to accept or willing to pay to avoid risks.
Government policies are not intended to protect every citizen from all fatal risks, because
minimizing public risk would be too costly. People accept some level of risk in exchange
for other personal preferences. For example, speed limits are not 40 miles per hour on
freeways because the lower speed limits increase the transportation time, which is
considered an economic cost. The drivers miss an opportunity to be productive at work or
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enjoy their leisure time. Current speed limits show that the benefits of lower and safer
speed limits do not exceed marginal benefits of traffic injury and fatality.
The BCA appears to be conducive method to pass efficient policy, meaning that at
least one individual’s life can improve without making anyone else worse off. The two
strengths of the VSL in a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is first, that the BCA is a decisive
tool, and second, that society's preferences are represented in the model through the VSL.
A BCA can identify a socially optimal policy from an inefficient and ineffective policy.
Citizens can then utilize this analysis to pass agreeable regulations that increase society's
well-being.
Distorted VSLs, however, can directly determine the level of public welfare. The
individuals composing of the general public are self-interested utility-maximizers who
want accurate benefit-cost analysis for proposed regulations. If the BCA is correctly
calculated, it can be a decisive method for passing policy. A policy that does not pass a
BCA and, yet, a rule is still approved because of incorrect calculations would mean that
citizens are being overregulated and their utility restricted. Mandates are funded either
through taxes or increased costs of products, due to regulations and additional expenses
imposed on businesses. The more income that an individual can spend on goods and
services rather than spending to decrease the risk of death, the more the individual can
increase his or her utility. The public views the BCA as a method to safeguard that their
money is not being spent on needless regulations. Similarly, society would not have the
correct amount of benefits from a regulation if the BCA is not correctly calculated and no
policy is passed. Inaccurate measurements for life-saving policy can overregulate,
decreasing the public's welfare, or under regulated, allowing potential premature deaths.
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Though BCA and the VSL are intended to be a scientific method to pass
regulation, the standards of an accurate measurement are not being met by government
agencies. The public relies on the dangerous assumption that only socially beneficial
policies, as determined with BCAs, are passed (Buchanan, 1978). Most people, however,
do not expend their time or resources to research the details of agencies' methods of
passing regulations. Little does the public know of the large uncertainty and inflation in
the VSL calculations for BCAs. Agencies' reliance on uncertain data and statistical
estimations as well as risk perceptions are often exaggerated to inflate the VSL.
Furthermore, rather than use a fully informed individual's risk-preferences as a reference
point to determine BCA's, government agencies exploit public risk misperceptions when
it is in the agencies’ favor.
Public choice theory asserts that both Congress and bureaus utilize the VSL to
progress their agendas. The individuals that make up Congress and bureaus are rationally
self-interested individuals (Buchanan, 1978). Congress will often propose policies if it
increases their likelihood of reelection. For example, a constituent supports stricter
environmental regulation because she views the state of the environment may be harmful
to her health. If a Congresswoman uses the information that people prefer more
environmental policy, that Congresswoman will attempt to pass acts, which will increase
the public’s positive view of her. Agencies then utilize this information to pass
regulations that will advance the Congresswoman's goals in addition to the agency's foals.
Congress, of course, allows the regulations to stand, as the regulations advance their
interests in reelection. Regulators are incentivized to inflate the VSL to create policy with
the intention of increasing the agency’s regulatory power and budgets (Niskanen, 1971).
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Inflating the VSL advances agencies’ goals to maximize budgets and to pass an
ambitious level of policies. Agencies inflate the VSL through ambiguous estimation
methods, utilizing common risk misperceptions, and adopting flawed guidelines for
behavioral failures. The (OMB) determines the regulatory agenda, allowing for poor
policy guidelines to progress the president's agenda.
Politicians are incentivized to pervert the VSL to deceptively boost benefit-cost
analysis. Despite the VSL and BCAs being viewed by the public as a rational and honest
method of passing favorable policies, the calculations will likely not change without
correctly aligned political incentives for more accurate assessments.
Case Studies: Incentives of Regulatory Agencies
These two case studies demonstrate how the Environmental Protection Agencies
(EPA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) institutionalize behavioral biases and
political incentives. The case studies provide evidence that both agencies' VSLs are
highly uncertain if not inflated.
"Senior Discount Rate"
In 2003, a political outrage over a proposed age adjustment to the EPA's VSL
demonstrates political incentives to maximize budgets and regulatory power. The "senior
death discount," as many media centers named it, was a suggestion made by the EPA that
supported lowering the VSL by 37% for those 65 years and older (EPA, 1999). A
political firestorm broke out over the EPA’s policy. Any chance of reducing the EPA's
VSL to account for the preferences of the elderly were dropped. In 2011, the Science
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Advisory Board (SAB) stated that the EPA's VSL is not a "one size fits all" value, and
that a constant VSL may not reflect public preferences and is likely inaccurate (EPA,
2011b). The problems with a constant VSL is that it does not communicate what kind of
risk is actually being reduced; different risks are found to have significantly different
WTP preferences (e.g. cancer mortality WTP compared to traumatic injury).
In 2003, the EPA found evidence to support adjusting their VSL to accommodate
for different willingness to pay estimates for different ages, particularly decreasing the
VSL for those 65 years old and older (Jones-Lee, 1989; Jones-Lee et al., 1993). Senator
Boxer of California responded to this decrease in the VSL by immediately claiming that
it was "outrageous" and that she would introduce legislation to "reduce this
unconscionable decision" (Robinson, 2008). No legislation was passed to allow the VSL
to decrease, regardless of the new studies, research, and evidence found that suggested a
lower VSL for the subpopulation. Senator Boxer even threatened to pass legislation that
set a floor to a VSL value (Robinson, 2008). Additionally, Congress prohibited the EPA
from underwriting an analysis on age adjustments to the VSL in the fiscal year 2004
Appropriation Bill (H.R. 2673). Later, the OMB advised government agencies to avoid
adapting VSLs for age (Graham, 2003), based off of more current research published by
Alberini (2004). Even with the evidence that elderly people are willing to pay less for
small mortality risk reductions, politics intervened in the process of updating the
accuracy of the EPA’s VSL and halted further research on age adjustments.
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Reestimating the VSL using Speed
Limits and Traffic Fatalities
The DOT is the second case study that demonstrates another bias in VSL
estimates. The study takes place in 1987 when the federal government permitted states to
increase their speed limits on rural Interstates. Higher speed limits are associated with
greater traffic fatalities (Ashenfelter & Greenstone, 2002). Only a handful of states
increased their speed limits, which increased the federal speed limit by 2 mph and
national motor vehicle fatalities by 35% (Ashenfelter & Greenstone, 2002). Ashenfelter
and Greenstone (2002) used the number of hours saved with the increased speed limits,
multiplied it by the average wage, and estimated that the VSL was equal to $2.4 million,
in terms of the increased state speed limits. The DOT (2015) officially reports, however,
that their VSL to be more than $9.2 million. The VSL Ashenfelter and Greenstone
calculated suggests that the DOT's policies may be lower than the DOT estimates. A
lower VSL would decrease the benefits of the DOT's proposed policies, decreasing the
DOT's regulatory power and economic impact.
To reiterate from the behavioral economics section, people tend to deflate
relatively larger risks like transportation and heart disease. Though the risks of driving
are well-known, state representatives still increased speed limits in 1987. Raising speed
limits while fully informed of the additional risk implies that representatives listen to
their constituents and are implementing constituent's psychological biases. Increasing
transportation risks is inconsistent use of peoples’ risk perceptions and willingness to pay
to avoid risk. In terms of public policy, the regulators may be employing the biased
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information that individuals perceive driving as less risky than reality and prefer higher
speed limits.
Both the case study of the "Senior Discount Rate" and a DOT case study support
public choice theory that bureaus aim to maximize their budgets and powers (Niskanen,
1971). These case studies demonstrate that government agencies inconsistently
institutionalize psychological biases to increase an agency’s regulatory power. The EPA
tends to regulate ambiguous and less controllable situations. People tend to avoid
uncertainty and ambiguity or inflate the actual risk probability. On the other hand, instead
of inflating the probability of harm, people tend to deflate the probability of death or
injury when it comes to transportation risks. People believe that they are more in control
of their vehicle and can avoid the risk of death. People undervalue the actual probability
of death via vehicle accident and therefore underestimate transportation risk values. In
short, an inflated VSL may mean that there is overregulation in agencies that use VSLs in
their BCAs, and agencies like the DOT inconsistently employ VSLs, which contradicts
the agency’s objectives to increase social welfare.
Civil Society Solutions Versus Government Solutions
Government solutions are often sought after to rectify individuals harmed or
killed by difficult-to-pinpoint sources like environmental pollutions or traffic hazards. It
is not often considered, however, whether or not citizens may be better-off with "nudges"
or nongovernment solutions.
When harmful externalities affect populations, the government intervenes to
prevent additional health problems or premature deaths. Agencies often do this by
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passing regulations which can lead to overregulated markets. Public choice explains that
agencies are incentivized to create regulations to maximize agency budgets and
regulatory power (Niskanen, 1971). When the public acts rationally based off of bad
information that cause self-harm (e.g., people over or underestimate risks), there are two
options considered: one, analysts choose the best policy option, and two, analysts respect
consumer sovereignty. Informational "nudges" or consumer sovereignty options are often
not considered as a solution to externalities, but nudges or free-markets could provide the
more socially optimal solutions than government solutions.
With option one, analysts choose the "best" policy option to address public selfharm (e.g., overestimated risks), which infringes on consumer sovereignty. This option,
using public choice theory, is shown as not providing the best solution for the public.
According to public choice theory, the political incentives are aligned for overregulated
and inefficient markets. This is because regulators are not incentivized to do what's
necessarily best for the public but rather to do what's best for their own self-interest. The
VSL is an example where politicians overregulate at the cost to social welfare.
In option two, analysts respect consumer sovereignty and ignore shouts of
unfairness. Private consumers have incentives to maximize their utility. If individuals
face the consequences of their decisions, people are incentivized to overcome their biases
in order to increase their utility and lifespan. Furthermore, individuals have greater local
information compared to an analyst or government, and thus are able to overcome biases
or use market solutions (Hayek, 1945).
An example of an informational "nudge" comes from the EPA and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) fuel economy rule in 2011 (EPA,
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2011a). The agencies now require fuel economy labels for all new vehicles. This provides
consumers with information and an easy method for comparison and prioritization. This
information may help increase rational consumer decision-making.
Informational nudges are also not necessarily required for consumers to make
decisions. If the information is valued by society, entrepreneurs and opportunists often
find ways to provide information to consumers, making both the consumers and the
supplier better-off. The supplier gains profits, and the consumer's demands are satisfied.
Market solutions also tend to be economically efficient because of supplier competition.
More competition decreases equilibrium prices if demand is constant. Lower prices allow
consumers to spend their limited income on other goods and services, in turn increasing
individual satisfaction. A case of private markets providing consumer information are the
case of diet fads. Many companies have begun labeling food to match consumer demand.
Recent example of this include labels for organic, gluten-free, or free-range products.
Just as the EPA and NHTSA and industries provide information to consumers to
increase decision-making power for consumers, informational nudges and/or markets are
also capable and perhaps more efficient for providing life-saving solutions. Two aspects
must be addressed: psychological biases and proposed solutions to mitigate risk. For
example, a business can report how much arsenic is in a public water system and also
provide the statistical risk and what side effects are of being affected by the arsenic. With
that information, people can decide for themselves if they are willing to pay for the water
provided by the business in order to mitigate the risk of the public water with the higher
levels of arsenic. This method also avoids the oversimplification problem addressed
previously.
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CONCLUSION
Government agencies use the Value of a Statistical Life in benefit-cost analyses to
pass regulations. There are significant areas of distortion, however, with the methods and
content used to calculate the VSL. These distortions exaggerate the VSL and lead to
overregulated markets and an inefficient economy. Public choice theory explains why
ambiguous and inflated estimates have been employed by agencies with the objective of
maximizing budgets and increasing regulatory power.
People, including those in government offices, are rationally self-interested.
Individuals in government positions do not lose self-interest once elected to become
selfless public servants. Agencies aim to maximize budgets and job security. The VSL is
an example of an opportunity where agencies employ distorted information and public
risk biases to pass regulation.
Congress enacts rules that lay down a road for overregulation. Agencies are
expected to create mandates that satisfy the rules passed by Congress. Agencies,
however, use outdated and often irrelevant data, inaccurate and imprecise econometric
methods, and institutionalize public behavioral biases to inflate VSL values in order to
enforce Congressional laws.
Though many situations, like those discussed in this paper, suggest that people are
behaviorally biased, it is often not considered how individuals can overcome those biases.
Policies and regulations are an inefficient and indirect method of changing unwanted
public behaviors. Without direct and accountable incentives to avoid harm, markets will
be overregulated and inefficient, which in turn makes society worse-off. If people face
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the consequences of their decisions, they are incentivized to search out true information
to avoid those harms. Rather than remove choice from individuals through regulation,
providing "nudges" are often an optimal compromise of decreasing the cost of
information without removing consumer consequences. To avoid government
inefficiencies and unnecessary costs, society must require representative VSL estimations
or adopt free-market solutions.
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